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ABSTRACT: Negotiation analysis is a branch of mathematical decision theory involving a dialectical
rationality standard for the resolution of dissensus. Negotiations are settings of group decision making
where people cooperate to arrive at a joint decision representing a mutually acceptable solution of the
negotiation problem. Criteria of what is mutually acceptable can be regarded as common grounds. They
serve as stopping conditions for the argumentation process during negotiation. Fairness and efficiency are
examples.
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INTROCUCTION
The estimation of the role and significance of dissensus and common grounds may
benefit from the analysis of rationality models. This analysis will show that dissensus and
common grounds are not restricted to the status of purely verbal concepts, but that they
can –and should be – extended to mathematical concepts as well. This extension will be
executed in the realm of negotiation analysis including fair division theory, which is part
of decision theory. The extension draws on the existence of different models of
rationality. There are four models to distinguish, each of which is introduced by a
sketched portrait:
1. Bounded rationality (BR) BR addresses individual decision making or problem solving
in a specific task environment under side conditions of limited time, money, knowledge,
memory and other resources beyond social interaction. It relies on plausible reasoning
based on heuristics exploiting domain specific expertise. Its characteristic rationality
criterion is goodness of fit or the matching between heuristics and environment.
2. Consistency-rationality (CR) Its focus is on contradiction-free thinking (judging &
reasoning). Reasoning is subjected to principles of formal logic or mathematics. Its
characteristic rationality criterion is consistency. Principles of social-interaction beyond
formal logic or mathematics do not affect reasoning.
3. Social rationality (SR 1): rhetorical rationality According to Aristotle, rhetorical
rationality is concerned with influencing the decision making of another party (audience)
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via (re)presentational means (verbal, non-verbal). It is based on plausible reasoning,
weight-of-argument enhancing reasoning, embedded into social interaction and,
therefore, audience-directed and yesability-driven. Rationality criterion is acceptable
reasoning.
4. Social rationality (SR 2): dialectical rationality It addresses joint (competitive &
cooperative) problem solving or decision making by exchanging objections in a
dialogical setting. Its logical surplus is captured by exchange-of-objection formats or
dialogue games. The corresponding rationality criterion is mutual acceptability of moves
and countermoves within a dialogue format.
Negotiation Analysis is of interest here because it invokes two of those rationality
concepts: consistency-rationality and social- rationality: Dissensus and common grounds
are embedded into the mathematical models of negotiation analysis and become basic
analytical concepts. As a consequence, acceptability of solution concepts and agreement
to solution - key SR-features of negotiations – become key features of negotiation
analysis as well.
Dissensus in Negotiation Analysis is represented by the so-called negotiator´s
dilemma (Lax and Sebenius 1986, pp. 29-45) comprising the conflicting aims of
creating and claiming value as the basic underlying conflict structure.
Common grounds in negotiation analysis are concepts for the resolution of the
negotiator´s dilemma that are mutually acceptable for the negotiating parties.
To resolve the negotiator´s dilemma amounts to solving two partial problems
simultaneously (not in a temporal sense): the G-problem of creating joint gains and the Δproblem of dividing or distributing the joint gain. Two types of common grounds come
into play here: Efficiency for resolving the G- problem and fairness concepts for
resolving the Δ- problem.
The interplay of dissensus and its resolution by common grounds in negotiation
analysis can be studied most easily by studying the sub-problem of fair division. Fair
division is something like the bones under the flesh of negotiation analysis.
The treatment of the subject here will be different from standard approaches to
negotiation analysis or bargaining theory. Here the focus is on how different rationality
models interact in the analysis of negotiation problems and, in particular, in fair division
problems. This presentation mode aims at developing a new position within the
rationality dispute of economic theory which is nourished by attacks of diverse schools of
bounded rationality against the consistency-rationality models of classical economic
theory. It will be argued that a fundamental rationality model, the model of social
rationality with its two branches of rhetorical and dialectical rationality, was ignored or
just forgotten in this dispute. Taking it into account, should alter the scene.
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1. CR → SR: SOCIAL RATIONALITY´S GAINS FROM INCLUDING
CONSISTENCY-RATIONALITY APPROACHES
Purely verbal SR-based treatments of negotiation, in splendid isolation from CR concepts
and methods, soon encounter their genuine limitations. Consider, for example, Douglas
Walton´s section on negotiation dialogue (Walton 1995, pp. 103-6). There, he correctly
discriminates negotiation dialogue from critical discussion. The focus is no longer on
conflict of opinion. Truth as the dominating value is replaced by money or other
economic values. Part of the problem negotiators face is that they “cannot have all they
want” (Walton 1995, p. 103). They aim at finding a compromise “acceptable to both
parties” - SR rationality solution criteria are requested. Walton discriminates between
four subtypes of negotiation dialogue. Three of them are particularly interesting in our
context:
Distributive bargaining where goals of the parties are “in basic conflict”;
Integrative bargaining “where there is no basic conflict” (Walton 1995, p. 104)
between the negotiators´ goals, and “ where the interests of both parties can be
integrated, to some degree” (Walton 1995, p. 104).
In attitudinal structuring the character of relationships matters significantly
besides the “economic” dimension.
If we introduce CR concepts and methods from mathematical decision theory, the
analytical and practical capacities will be improved significantly. The decisive new step
is the introduction of numbers to express and measure the preferences the different parties
have for the issues, options, or goods at stake.
By making use of the new analytical approach, it can be shown that – contrary to
Walton´s assumption - both parties can get all they want. 100%-solutions are possible.
For example, imagine a cake, half chocolate, half vanilla and two persons who want to
divide it among them. Assume, as a first case, that both parties, Adam and Eve, do not
know each other, that is to say, do not know their preferences. Adam likes chocolate and
dislikes vanilla and Eve likes vanilla and dislikes chocolate. We introduce numbers by
letting ”likes” correspond to the attachment of 100 points to the object of concern and
“dislikes” correspond to the attachment of 0 points. In the case of unknown preferences,
a division giving each of them one half of the cake consisting of a 50%-vanilla and a
50%- chocolate zone would be regarded as fair. That is, Adam and Eve receive both a
piece that is worth 50 points to them.
A better division is available if both know their preferences. Then a division
respecting their preferences gives each 100% of what he or she likes: a piece of chocolate
only for Adam worth 100 points to him and a piece of vanilla only for Eve worth 100
points to her. This division will be called efficient because there is no division which
makes both parties better off. For this reason, the first division was inefficient.
Efficiency is a cornerstone concept of economic theory. By introducing numerical
valuation schemes into the task of resolving dissensus in negotiation problems, the
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mathematical concept of efficiency becomes available as a new type of common ground.
We will develop this idea further in the next sections.
Another gain from numerical valuation schemes is that they can be used to
analyse the structure of the negotiation problem, that is, the structure underlying the
conflict of interests. It defines the frame, the “space” where the parties move in to reach a
solution. There are structure dependent a priori solution points which serve as attractors
for the argumentation process of solving conflicts of interests. These points represent
good solutions.
2. SR → CR: CONSISTENCY-RATIONALITY´S GAINS FROM INCLUDING
SOCIAL RATIONALITY APPROACHES
There are also profits to be had in the opposite direction: mathematical bargaining and
negotiation models also profit from the social rationality approach: The acceptability
standard helps to explain how social actors coordinate their expectations for getting to an
agreement.
Within the context of negotiation and fair division, resolution of dissensus is built
on common, objective, grounds. Common grounds are interpretations and
implementations of the social rationality standard of (mutual) acceptability. Common
grounds guide the parties when they are required to coordinate their expectations of what
may be mutually acceptable.
Mutual acceptability does not mean: each party regards only its own share or
payoff as yesable but does mean: they each regard their own share and that of the other as
acceptable, or in short, the complete allocation of shares or advantages. Thus, the
standard of mutual acceptability involves social comparisons. This form of otherdirectedness is captured by social utility:
Individual negotiators evaluate the acceptability of their own outcomes relative to the outcomes
obtained by the other negotiators. This socially influenced preference structure is called “social
utility”. Negotiators concerned with socia1 utility will reject offers that represent significant gains
for themselves on the grounds that the gains for the other side are disparately and unreasonably
much larger (Raiffa et al. 2002, p. 280).

Social comparisons in this sense make up the basis of fairness concepts. Fairness
concepts offer modes of coping with unacceptable differences. Thus, fairness concepts
represent an important class of common grounds. In the next section, we shall see how
they work as solution concepts in fair division problems.
Social comparisons have also an emotional impact in raising Δ-emotions, as I
would like to dub emotions, like envy, that are stirred up by differences (see, for example,
Aristotle`s Rhetoric, bk.II, ch.10). Fair solutions help to quench the flames of envy
(Brams and Taylor 1996, p. 4).
In the individualistic setting of the alternating offers game, the players do not care
about what the other side receives. Social comparisons do not play any role. In the
common grounds interpretation of acceptability, they do. And as a consequence, fairness
becomes a clue to the resolution of dissensus in negotiations and division problems. From
the perspective of the conflicting parties, the fairness criteria are common grounds, that
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is, arguments which help them to coordinate their expectations on the mutually
acceptable.
3. CR+SR: THE MERGER. THE Δ-G APPROACH TO DISSENSUS AND COMMON
GROUNDS
Sections 1. and 2. made apparent that negotiation analysis and fair division involve a dual
concept of common grounds: as mathematical solution concepts on one side, and as
discourse arguments implementing the acceptability standard of social rationality on the
other. Efficiency as well as fairness criteria are common grounds in this dual sense,
mathematical solution concepts on one side, arguments on the other, which explain why
these solution properties are effective in social interaction problem solving. They help the
interacting parties to coordinate their expectations on them. And used as arguments in a
discourse, they have the power to convince the problem solving parties to follow the
solution path they suggest.
Before we put these concepts to work, a few preliminary remarks are in order.
The type of dissensus these concepts tackle are interaction problems of the
negotiator´s dilemma structure.
A negotiator´s dilemma comprises two sub-problems that any negotiator faces:
enlarging the “pie”, the joint gain, and dividing it, that is, to distribute the advantages
among the parties and determine their individual payoffs. The first sub-problem requires
a cooperative spirit, the second solicits competition. Both sub-problems represent
conflicting goals which must be realised simultaneously.
A solution must address both sub-problems, must solve each of them and the
conflict between them.
Efficiency is a solution concept for the first sub-problem. It avoids that feasible
joint gains for the parties remain on the table. But solving this sub-problem does not
deliver a single solution, but a set of possible solution points with efficiency as their
common property.
In order to single out a solution, the second sub-problem must be solved. This
amounts to selecting that efficient solution candidate which determines a distribution of
the whole joint gain such that each party accepts its allotted share. Fairness concepts are
designed to guide this selection.
It must be noted that fairness and efficiency are independent solution concepts.
Efficiency does not entail fairness, and vice versa. A fair solution may be inefficient (an
example will be given) and efficient solutions may be unfair. Thus, the problem of
solving both sub-problems simultaneously is by no means trivial.
Efficiency and fairness in a tandem package offer an attractive and convincing
strategy to cope with dissensus of the negotiator´s dilemma type: Efficiency offers an
incentive to cooperate, fairness abates the fear of getting a raw deal.
For convenience, I dub the first sub-problem as the G-problem (G for joint gains)
and the second the Δ-problem (Δ for differences in shares).
In order to demonstrate how efficiency and fairness in tandem resolve the
negotiator´s dilemma, I`ll introduce “tandem procedures”, or Δ-G procedures, for the
solution of fair division problems.
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A procedure is a process structure which prescribes the steps from problem to
solution. A Δ-G procedure is characterized by G-steps and Δ-steps.
An idealized version or skeleton of a Δ-G procedure comprises the following steps:
1. G-steps securing efficiency
2. Δ-steps or adjustment steps which reduce payoff differences between the parties
3. a stopping rule stopping the adjustment process and implementing a Δ-G solution,
i.e., an efficient and fair solution
4. the agreement step as a final step where the parties add an explicit YES to the
result of step 3, which was only acceptable. It implements a SR-decision rule to
ensure an unanimous acceptance of the solution.
We`ll study two fair division procedures by matching them with the skeleton procedure to
understand their merits:
•
•

Divide & choose
Adjusted Winner

These procedures differ in their Δ- an their G properties. There are three Δ-properties or
fairness concepts to be implemented procedurally: Proportionality, envy-freeness, and
equitability.
Following Brams and Taylor`s parlance (1996, p. 9), proportionality means that
each of two parties gets at least ½ of the cake measured in terms of its own valuation
profile, provided that both parties have equal entitlements. (Another term used to capture
this special case is parity.)
Envy-freeness means that the distribution is such that no party prefers another`s
share to its own.
A distribution is equitable if the shares of the parties are equal in terms of their
respective different valuation profiles
Envy-freeness, and equitability differ by the modes of comparison they imply.
Envy-freeness is based on internal comparisons, that is, a party compares its own portion
with that of others in terms of its own personal valuation profile. Equitability, by contrast,
compares different portions in terms of the different valuation profiles as given by the
parties under comparison.
4. TWO FAIR DIVISION PROCEDURES:
DIVIDE & CHOOSE, KNASTER´S PROCEDURE, ADJUSTED WINNER (AW)
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict the discussion of procedures to fair division
problems with two parties. For the numerical expression of the subjective significance or
value the parties attach to the items to be distributed, we introduce two valuation modes:
a point allocation scheme where 100 points have to be allocated between the items
according to their relative subjective significance, and an auction scheme where the bids
in Euro for one item in the pool measure their subjective significance for each party (it’s
just a bid and not the – intersubjective – market price!).
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We´ll study the two procedures in solving the following inheritance problem
where 10 items left to them by their father have to be divided by the siblings Klaus and
Ingrid. The ten items (Brams and Taylor´s example (1996, p. 11), modified):
A 12-foot aluminium row boat, a 3-horse-power outboard motor, a piano in fairly
good shape, a one-year old flat screen TV set, a hunting rifle, a collection of
Italian Opera records, a 1968 Hanomag tractor, an older pick-up truck, two 2 year
old mountain bikes.
Because Klaus´ and Ingrid´s life circumstances, life styles and locations are different –
Ingrid being a lawyer, mother of 2 teenagers, living in a village near Frankfurt, and
Klaus, having no children, living with his wife in the rural coastal area near his parents`
home, and making money with tourist services - the subjective values given to the same
items differ.
Their assessments of the items are listed in monetary terms (Euro) and point
scores:
Table1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

items

Klaus
€

Ingrid
€

Klaus
%

Ingrid
%

boat
motor
piano
TV set
rifle
records collection
tractor
pick-up
mountain bike
mountain bike

2 000
2 000
300
150
600
300
3 000
2 000
2 000
2 000

600
600
2 000
2 000
400
600
200
1 000
2 000
2 000

14
14
2
1
4
2
21
14
14
14

6
6
17
17
4
6
2
8
17
17

total value

14 350

11 400

100

100

There are 210 = 1024 possibilities to divide 10 goods among 2 persons. Thus, the
bargaining set consists of 1024 possible solutions. The task of the procedures is to
identify those among them that satisfy the desired and prescribed criteria.
Divide & Choose
This procedure is the most simple one. Even children use it. There are two roles, that of a
divider, and that of chooser. The divider allocates the goods to two packages. Then the
chooser makes his or her choice. The decision who becomes divider and who chooser is
nontrivial, but will not be discussed here.
Assuming that Klaus is the divider, he might compose the following two packages
safeguarding him a 50%- share of the inheritance no matter how Ingrid makes her choice
(the worth of each package for Ingrid is added):
7
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Table 2. Divide and Choose. An example
divider: Klaus, chooser: Ingrid
P1:
boat
Klaus 14
Ingrid 6

TV set
1
17

1 mountain bike
14
17

tractor
21
2

-

-

∑
50
42

P2:
motor
Klaus 14
Ingrid 6

piano
2
17

1 mountain bike
14
17

pick-up
14
8

records
2
6

rifle
4
4

∑
50
58

Divide & choose generates a solution which is proportional, that is, it guarantees to each
party what he or she perceives to be at least the half of “the pie”. And, in the 2 persons
case, it is also envy-free because neither player has a reason to think that the other party
got a larger piece than he or she got. Thus, divide & choose is a fair procedure, but, in
general, not efficient. Think of the vanilla-chocolate-cake example of the first section: if
each party receives a cake`s half consisting equally of chocolate and vanilla parts, then
such a division is envy-free, but inefficient, because a partition of the cake along the
chocolate-vanilla “frontier” would make both parties better off.
In a sense, divide & choose is a dangerous procedure because of its simplicity. It´s
just this simplicity which may easily seduce a party to agree to an utterly inefficient
distribution. Call this the simplicity fallacy.
Adjusted Winner
Adjusted winner is a procedure developed by Steven Brams and Alan Taylor in 1996
(Brams and Taylor 1996, pp.65-75). It is a procedure with remarkable properties: it is
efficient, envy-free, and equitable. Equitability involves external, interpersonal
comparisons. It may be characterized by the following question:
Is your announced valuation of what you received equal to your opponent’s announced valuation
of what he or she received? (Brams and Taylor 1996, p. 71)

The steps:
1. efficiency: determine an efficient interim solution by giving each item to that
party who values it most. The party who gained the most points at this step is the
temporary winner.
2. to prepare the adjustment steps, calculate the rates of substitution for each item,
that is, divide the Ingrid point score by the Klaus point score, or vice versa, and
rank the rates of substitution from least to largest
3. adjustment steps: transfer the item with the first ranking rate of substitution from
the temporary winner to the temporary loser. Repeat this step along the ranking of
the substitution rates until the temporary loser´s point score exceeds the temporary
winner´s score.
8
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4. stop rule, last adjustment step: divide the last item from step 3 such that both
parties end up with equal point scores.
Table 4. Adjusted Winner. An Example
1. Efficiency step

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

item

Klaus

Ingrid

boat
motor
piano
TV set
rifle
record collection
tractor
pick-up
mountain bike
mountain bike

14
14
2
1
4
2
21
14
14
14

6
6
17
17
4
6
2
8
17
17

total value
received value

100
63

100
78

Rates of substitution
(ranking)

17/2 = 8.5
17/1 = 17
4/4 = 1.0
6/2 = 3.0

(5)
(6)
(1)
(4)

17/14 = 1.2
17/14 = 1.2

(2)
(3)

Ingrid is the temporary winner of step 1.
Adjustment steps:
2. Equitability adjustments preserving efficiency
+4
Ingrid → Klaus: rifle (1)
adjusted point score
67
Ingrid → Klaus: mountain bike (2)
adjusted point score

-4
74

+ 14

- 17

81

57

3. Final adjustment step: the zero difference step
Tying the score: 67 + kּ14 = 57 + (1-k)ּ17
k = 7/31 (22.6%)
mountain bike share (values)
received point total

3.2
70.2

13.2
70.2

This solution is efficient, because the adjustment process preserves efficiency realised at
the interim solution step. And it is envy-free because no party has an argument to change
the allotted packages. And it is equitable because no (further) transfer is justified.
Its drawback: like Knaster´s procedure it is open to misrepresentation of
preferences – theoretically-, but practically it is rather robust because a slight mistake in
assessing the scoring of the other side can have a disastrous boomerang effect.
The dual character of the stopping rule:
9
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Mathematically: calculate a convex combination to determine the solution point
(Δ = 0).
Socially: stop the difference reductions where “differences” disappear.
Why is the final step of adding a SR-decision rule necessary? A SR-decision rule is
necessary because the mathematical procedures end up with an acceptable solution only.
The task of the decision rule is, therefore, to manage the transition from acceptable to
accepted.
The standards which make up the solution are valid in general, but the payoffs for
the players, induced by the standards in the special case at stake, are something
individual. Between the general and the individual is a gap that must be closed. This is
managed via individual agreement. The decision rule captures this aspect.
The step from acceptability to acceptance, from Yesability to Yes, is a
communicative act, a genuine act of social rationality. It may take the form: To each
negotiating party: communicate your personal YES to the solution.
These mutual Yeses transform the solution into a commitment or agreement.
5. THE NEW MODEL OF CR+SR VS. BR: THE SURPLUS
We are now in a position to demarcate the new CR+SR approach against the paradigm of
bounded rationality (BR), inaugurated by Herbert Simon and developed further, among
others, by Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten. To characterize their perspective on BR,
the following quotation will be helpful. It facilitates the comparison between the two
approaches. Gigerenzer and Selten specify models of bounded rationality the following
way:
We mentioned at the beginning that, so far, there is no complete theory of bounded rationality.
Nevertheless, we can specify three classes of processes that models of bounded rationality
typically specify:
1. Simple search rules. The process of search is modelled on step-by-step procedures, where
a piece of information is acquired, or an adjustment is made (such as to increase running
speed to keep the angle of gaze constant), and then the process is repeated until it is
stopped.
2. Simple stopping rules. Search is terminated by simple stopping rules, such as to choose
the first object that satisfies an aspiration level. The stopping rule can change as a
consequence of the length of search or other information, as in aspiration adaptation
theory […]. Simple stopping rules do not involve optimization calculations, such as
computations of utilities and probabilities to determine the optimal stopping point.
3. Simple decision rules. After search is stopped and a limited amount of information has
been acquired, a simple decision rule is applied, like choosing the object that is favored
by the most important reason – rather than trying to compute the optimal weights for all
reasons, and integrating these reasons in a linear or nonlinear fashion, as is done in
computing a Bayesian solution.
The process of search distinguishes two classes of models of bounded rationality: those that search
for alternatives (e.g., aspiration level theories such as satisficing […]), and those that search for
cues (e.g., fast and frugal heuristics […]) (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002, p. 8).

Two aspects should be added:
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1) The BR model is a problem-solving model (or metaphor), based on a conception of
thinking as heuristic search, as opposed to the reasoning model (or metaphor):
The reasoning metaphor views goals as described by sentences, derived from other sentences by
processes similar to the processes of logic. The problem-solving metaphor views goals as achieved
by sequences of moves through a problem space (Simon 1990, p. 12).

The CR+SR model unites both strands, as the “+” character already indicates.
2) Similarly, the thesis that “bounded rationality is procedural, not substantive
rationality” (Simon 1997, p. 271), is opposed by its CR+SR counterpart: The CR+SR
approach invokes procedural and substantive rationality.
The main lines of comparison:
Different understandings of “problem” BR- problems concern individual problem
solving. Problems of concern are the search for alternatives or the search for cues. For
example, if the task is to estimate whether city A is larger than city B or vice versa, a
discriminating cue may be “premier league soccer team”. If A has one and B not, A may
be estimated to be the larger city.
In contrast, CR+SR problems address problems of social interaction, social
conflict, appearances of dissensus like the negotiator´s dilemma.
Different understandings of “solution” All CR+SR solution concepts implement the
acceptability norm of social rationality whereas BR solutions are bound to individual
aspiration levels as solution standards.
The CR+SR approach relies on intersubjectively jusitifiable standards or common
grounds.
Furthermore, the CR+SR approach admits optimal solutions, if attainable by
simple procedures, whereas the BR approach dispenses with optimizing in favour of
“satisficing” (Simon). From the CR+SR stance, this seems to be unnecessary.
“Satisficing” expresses a solution standard which is alien to the spirit of the CR+SR
model. CR+SR solution concepts/ procedures are required to be acceptable. Acceptable
solutions are able to terminate dissensus, a dispute, a conflict. The acceptability standard
solves the coordination problem for social agents. They represent a focus for coordinating
the expectations of different brains.
“Satisficing” is an inappropriate concept for resolving conflicts of interest. Thus,
optimal & acceptable solutions, provided by simple CR+SR-procedures like Adjusted
Winner, oppose satisficing BR-solutions provided by BR-heuristics.
As a consequence of the merger of consistency-rationality and social rationality,
CR+SR solution concepts/ procedures combine (dialectical) reasoning & (mathematical)
problem solving instead of opposing them, as BR does – thus replacing their exclusiveOR-relation within bounded rationality by an AND.
A further consequence of the merger and advantage of the CR+SR model is that it
aligns procedural with substantive rationality, compared to BR which dissects them
(“Bounded rationality is procedural, not substantive rationality”. (Simon, 1997, 271)).
The CR+SR-procedures implement a priori solution concepts like fairness and efficiency
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which make up the normative, intersubjectively pre-existing substance, the stuff for the
resolution of dissensus.
Different understandings of “procedure” BR in the Gigerenzer-Selten-Simon sense is
based on heuristics, a weaker form of algorithm than it is invoked by the CR+SR
approach. Heuristics in this sense are not sufficient in the context of social rationality.
Due to the demands of social rationality, CR+SR-procedures must be and are
intersubjectively jusitifiable. Otherwise, they will not be accepted by the involved parties.
Because they are designed to implement a priori solution concepts of social rationality –
because of the characteristic alignment of procedural and substantive rationality – they
guarantee a solution with the predetermined properties. Because they implement a priori
solution concepts, CR+SR procedures do not map processes of search for a solution. It`s
only the payoffs of the parties in the problem context at hand, which are unknown and
have to be computed according to the solution concepts. That is why CR+SR procedures
exceed the power of mere heuristics, the cornerstone of BR, which always bear the risk of
providing no solution, a wrong solution, or a low quality solution. Because of their
weaknesses, heuristics, if transferred to the context of social interaction, may invite
exploitation of the weaknesses by other actors. Theoretically, even CR+SR procedures
like Knaster`s procedure or Adjusted Winner, are open to fallacious use and exploitation,
but, practically, the exigencies of manipulating them successfully are rather high. Thus,
the practical risk of being exploited is tolerable.
The BR approach is characterized by a trade-off between simplicity and precision.
Heuristics express the merits of this deal. They are simple, resources saving, mental
bounds respecting “good enough” problem solving devices. The presented CR+SR
procedures are also simple, save resources, respect mental bounds, reduce complexity,
but are more precise than heuristics–and are appropriate for resolving problems of social
interaction by incorporating common grounds, problems of dissensus as characterized by
the antagonistic tendencies of the negotiator`s dilemma, the requirement to cooperate and
to compete simultaneously.
CONCLUSION
The goal of the present paper is to demonstrate that dissensus and common grounds mark
off types of problems and solutions which cannot be captured by the bounded rationality
approach in its Gigerenzer-Selten-Simon appearance. They are fundamentals of social
rationality which cannot be reduced to bounded rationality. Though distinct from
consistency-rationality, social rationality can be combined with consistency-rationality
modelling to provide simple and frugal procedures for the solution of negotiation and fair
division problems.
link to commentary
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